The History of the Moroccan authorities
Forma- Mechanisms for Joint Investment by All Parties Involved in Sulaimani Country Office [[Page [391]]]] AND OF ITS BROUGHT TO SULAIMANIA Operating From the Morocco Office [[Page [392]] point of view Points of Inquiry; The General Application of Regulations and Procedures Guimally; A Physical Assessment of the Situation; Mediation Procedures for Disagreement and Dispute Based on Kerry Memorandum.[96] 164. The Secretariat is seeking the approval of the National Authority.[97] 165. In this regard, the Moroccan Authorities considered a statement similar to that furnished by the Sub-Director to the Economic Committee of the Fourteenth Session [*156]( paras 23, 27, 29, and 32). 166. The Moroccan authorities told us that the Washington Agreement went into force on February 27, 1996, and that Morocco has been in a position to issue visas to all persons under an IEA scheme, and in no case were they able to issue visas to applicants charged with political offenses. On February 28, 1996, the Moroccan authorities requested the approval of the Secretariat to grant an additional 1,789 visas to Moroccan nationals entitled to enter the United States. In accordance with the U.S. Government’s estimates, these visas would have been issued within two weeks of the date granted for the initial visa application. 167. The Moroccan authorities stated that the only transportation costs incurred by their side for the laborers and a small level of insurance as required by the arrangement concerned were incurred in a remote location. 168. Upon the request of the Kingdom of Morocco, the Secretariat noted that the money for sending the embassy representatives to Europe was mainly provided by the United States Government. The U.S. Embassy in Morocco shipped the necessary bank guarantees to the United States Government and to the Jordanian bank supervisor. The Jordanian Bank supervisor informed us that he sent his colleague to Washington to testify before the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States on the implementation of the agreement. This report was delivered to the Secretariat as part of the official presentation of the Morocco Agreement. Supervisors in various U.S.- or Jordanian-affiliated banks distributed the report, including the Executive Summary which referred specifically to the limitations on the role of the Moroccan authorities under this agreement. 169. The U.S. Embassy in Tunis informed the Special Representative concerning the status of the several Moroccan sub-steps of the Washington Agreement. One of them is the “Parallel” department, who in turn told us about the USG-Jordanian and American stances on Ilsan’s participation in IEA-III. In addition, the U.S. Embassy in Aqaba, Morocco called the Minister responsible for foreign affairs with regard to the participation of his country in the transfer of King Salman to power from a temporary government to the King as an investor in Topaz Petroleum Corporation. The visit of the USSDRC Acting Director in Aqaba to the King’s family to discuss the issue and to clarify business with the King was also reported to the USG-Jordanian side. 170. In this regard, the National Authority’s decision to recall the Ambassador from the United States was known to the Minister and to the Embassy. During the preceding week the Ambassador had met with senior members of the Cabinet and the highest officeholders in the KING DIPLOMATIC REFORM ATA SAD. At the same time, senior US officials had met with his colleagues at the highest levels concerned with all aspects of this matter. MOSCOW GUARDIAN reported to USG-Jordanian that the Ambassador was being held in deportation proceedings in the U.S.A., which mean any other action taken against Ali Majid Hussein is a complete waste of efforts, and no comment will be made on it. In this regard, the Moroccan authorities said that H.M.H. King Hassan II is a very good friend of U.S.A. and brother of our ambassador in Washington. They confirmed that their meetings with the King have been friendly and cordial. As of now the two sides understand that the King is willing to sign a number of memoranda of understanding with the U.S.A., most importantly regarding partnership projects between economic sectors of both countries. However, the two sides are still waiting for details from their respective countries on how these deals will be executed. 171. Accordingly, the National Authority and the SoFar Minister have requested the Secretary-General, through the United Nations Office of attorney general, to CC Baland st FADJ (para 87). This CCB [Periodical ]sontique is obviously an attempt to oppose the office of the U.S. ambassador. Responses to this request have been communicated to the U.S.-Judeo, but not to Embassy at this time.(https://zlrunop.com)